Afghansitan; Countdown to Transition

So we now have three and a half years to successfully transition Afghanistan into a peaceful, prosperous, politically inclusive nation. Can we do it? To coin a phrase ‘Yes we can.’

When I first patrolled the streets and villages of Kabul in 2002 I was infected with the endemic optimism that was so palpable you could almost see it. Despite many attempts to cure me I’m still chronically optimistic although I’m in remission at the moment. I now live and work amongst the Afghan people and although I share their concerns for the future I believe things can still turn out well if we take a different approach to the transition.

These are some of the key concepts that I believe could deliver results for a successful transition:

Focus on and reinforce success not failure.

We have been pouring all our efforts and resources into the problems not solutions. The US military is spending $120 billion on military operations this year to kill, capture or render ineffective 35,000 Taliban. That equates to $3.4 million per Talib. The US Departments of State and USAID are spending $2.5 billion on development for 30 million people. That equates to $83 per law abiding citizen. In effect we are saying that we value the Taliban 41,143 times more than a law abiding citizen. OK it’s a simplistic but I think relevant argument. Gen. Templer the man credited with one of the few Counter Insurgency success said something along the lines of ‘The shooting part of the business is only 25% of the trouble. The other 75% is economic and political.’ I and history think he’s right. We need to focus our efforts on finding and reinforcing every success rather than letting the Taliban lead our agenda by focusing on them.

‘It’s the Economy Stupid’.

James Carville was talking about domestic politics but he might as well have said it about Afghanistan. In 2002 the main thing the people I met wanted was jobs and economic opportunities, they still do. Development and war money has completely skewed the economy and there will be an inevitable collapse as both draw down. So we need to build the ‘real’ Afghan economy. This will also begin to provide the tax base we hope will support the Afghan Security Forces which are a key part of the current transition strategy.  I’m under no illusion that this is really difficult as Afghan goods are more expensive and lower quality than those made by their regional and global competitors. However the one thing that Afghans make that is world class is carpets. If you Google ‘oriental carpets’ you will find a handful of shops near you that sell Afghan carpets. If we provide marketing support so that more people buy Afghan rather than Iranian carpets the Afghan economy will inevitably grow. Work has been done on promoting Afghan business and export but this needs to become a strategic main effort. I would suggest that an air-bridge to regional and global markets with a dovetailed subsidy would be one of the best things we could do to build the vital Afghan export market.

Rethink and Replace the Ink-spots

I believe the COIN Ink-spot theory is sound but I suggest that instead of dropping our ink tactically into the fire of Helmand where it evaporates we place them strategically where they have the best chance of growing and spreading. This means that Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad, Kabul, Bamiyan and other relatively stable areas become the ink spots. I would suggest that if we build zones of peace and prosperity around these successes they will spread rapidly. I would have thought with the right resources the insurgents could be ejected from the entire north of the country from Herat round to Jalalabad with a slight bulge at Kunar and Nuristan that could be contained due to the difficult ground. This would provide a tax base and an example to the more restive areas of what life could be like if the population rejected the insurgents. Wherever there is a small success we should reinforce it and help it grow.

Contain don’t smash the insurgency.

Insurgents appear to act like jelly (jello for the US reader). If you smash a military fist into it then it spreads. I have been involved in an unusual but highly effective economic development project in the remote and peaceful Wakhan Corridor. In the last 18 months security in the proximity has deteriorated as insurgent groups look for new safe areas away from the COIN effort in the south. Now our project is in doubt. I would suggest that focusing the main conventional military efforts on the edges rather than the centre of the insurgency with Counter Terrorism ops into the centre would stop more of the country becoming unstable and deliver strategic results. There’s only a handful of ways through or around the Hindu Kush so blocking positions in these areas of vital ground could contain the insurgency in the south. I would suggest a substantial force south of Herat to contain the insurgency and another south of Kabul. Once established as a blocking force they could slowly move south with economic development initiatives just a few miles behind the ‘front line’.  There would be areas that could not be ‘won’ around the border with Waziristan but they could potentially be contained.

Finding the authentic Afghan voice and leadership.

I think the main problem we have faced in Afghanistan is that it is predominantly a US / Western effort. If any of you are working in Afghanistan you probably have some bright young Afghans working with you. They inevitably are well dressed, speak good English, hold one or two degrees and are probably studying for an MBA in the evenings.  Right now there’s only two ways to make money in Afghanistan; be involved with opium or the international community. When the international community leaves what are all these bright kids going to do? They will leave too. What we need to do is to really engage these bright young minds into creating their own vision of what Afghanistan could be and provide them the training and resources to make it happen. We need to give them a stake in their own futures and then they will fight for it. If we can help link them with their grandfathers who remember Afghanistan before the wars they will have the support and mentoring of the elders to begin a movement for positive change.

I'm under no illusion has to how difficult the transition will be and how hard it is to implement strategy in Afghanistan but if we can maintain focus for three and a half more years I'm sure we can deliver results. I'd be pleased to receive your comments.