British Army Learning Lessons from Afghanistan & Iraq

Interesting Chatham House article about how the British Army is learning lessons from the short comings in Afghanistan and Iraq. Would be interesting to know if the UK government  is conducting similar work on how the Diplomacy, Development and Defence work together to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Ideally there should be an Afghan Lessons Learned organisation that could feed into a number of the international organisations involved because there's a lot of lessons being re-learned with every tour.

But at least it is heartening to hear the Army are taking this seriously now. I really felt I was banging my head on a wall over the three years I worked in Defence Procurement from 2005-8. I believed we were losing in Iraq and Afghanistan for all the wrong reasons and yet there was no acknowledgement in procurement that anything was wrong....

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87_2foley_griffin_mccartney.pdf

Carnegie Paper on Afghanistan the Impossible Transition

DJ COMMENT: Gilles Dorronsoro argues that US COIN Strategy is failing and politically it is alienating negotiating partners. The big question is, what is the right strategy. I believe it is to build ink spots of success in the north and support them to grow rapidly. This will give the Afghans at least some sucess stories and something to fight for. The post transition economy is the elephant in the room which is only just being addressed so let's see what ideas the US comes up with.

Gilles Dorronsoro June 2011
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/15/afghanistan-impossible-transition/1yp
A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States–led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners

Afghanistan; Lessons Learned study by RAND

Improving U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

Lessons Learned from Afghanistan - 2008 - Seth Jones

DJ COMMENT:
A great piece of work by RAND. It is interesting that it was published in 2008 the year I was preparing to move back to Afghanistan. My conclusion at the time, and still is, is that we should have concentrated on winning the peace in the north not the 'war' in the south. 'Reinforce success and starve failure' as Sun Tzu put it. Seth and the Obama administration came to the opposite conclusion. I just wonder what Afghanistan would look like now if we'd spent $120 billion on development in the north rather than on the war in the south.

I also think there should be more on building support for the government by creating jobs and economic opportunity.  But aside from those personal observations it is a comprehensive review of recent counter insurgency operations and the relevant lessons for Afghanistan. COMMENT ENDS.


From the RAND website

In an effort to better understand the insurgency and its causes, the RAND Corporation conducted an exhaustive set of primary source interviews in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and Europe (including multiple visits to Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008); reviewed relevant government documents; and examined the literature on 90 insurgencies since 1945 to identify factors that can be correlated with success and failure.

What Variables Are Key to Counterinsurgency Success or Failure?

Based on the examination of 90 insurgencies since World War II, RAND found two major factors linked with the success (and failure) of past counterinsurgency efforts: (1) the degree of local support for the government and (2) external support for insurgents, including sanctuary.

The study found that governments with high levels of popular support prevailed in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, but they won less than a third of the insurgencies when they had medium or low levels of support. In addition, insurgent groups that enjoyed support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from nonstate actors and diaspora groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. Moreover, sanctuary in neighboring states was particularly important for insurgent groups.

The study identified some initial key steps to counter insurgent support, which are highlighted in the table.

Improving governance

Prosecute corrupt government officials and mid- and high-level drug traffickers; the failure to do so is eroding popular support for the government.

Continue building Afghan security forces, especially increasing police mentors in the field.

Focus on strategic reconstruction projects, such as Kaiaki Dam for electricity, which can provide key services to rural areas.

Ensure secure and successful 2009 democratic elections.

Increasing support to government

Increase the number of U.S./NATO forces by at least 28,000.

Refocus U.S./NATO resources on southern Afganistan.

Decreasing support to insurgents

• Increase pressure on Pakistan to counter the Taliban and end government support for militants.
• Establish a regional dialogue with Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia (reviving the 2001 Bonn approach) toward stabilizing Afghanistan.

The Need for Big Ideas for the Afghan Transition

“A stand can be made against invasions by armies but no stand can be made against invasion by an idea”

Victor Hugo

What is our big idea for Afghanistan? What is the Afghan’s big idea for their own country?

Maybe strategic communications should be about strategic listening so we can find the Afghans with  clear, compelling positive visions of what the country could look like in 2018 after the Transition.

We can help find, articulate and communicate an Afghan vision and then we can support it but it must be an Afghan vision.

My thought on the big idea for the Transition is focus on youth and business.