Beautiful Film About Everyday Life in Afghanistan

Afghanistan – touch down in flight from Augustin Pictures on Vimeo.

British Army Learning Lessons from Afghanistan & Iraq

Interesting Chatham House article about how the British Army is learning lessons from the short comings in Afghanistan and Iraq. Would be interesting to know if the UK government  is conducting similar work on how the Diplomacy, Development and Defence work together to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Ideally there should be an Afghan Lessons Learned organisation that could feed into a number of the international organisations involved because there's a lot of lessons being re-learned with every tour.

But at least it is heartening to hear the Army are taking this seriously now. I really felt I was banging my head on a wall over the three years I worked in Defence Procurement from 2005-8. I believed we were losing in Iraq and Afghanistan for all the wrong reasons and yet there was no acknowledgement in procurement that anything was wrong....

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87_2foley_griffin_mccartney.pdf

Carnegie Paper on Afghanistan the Impossible Transition

DJ COMMENT: Gilles Dorronsoro argues that US COIN Strategy is failing and politically it is alienating negotiating partners. The big question is, what is the right strategy. I believe it is to build ink spots of success in the north and support them to grow rapidly. This will give the Afghans at least some sucess stories and something to fight for. The post transition economy is the elephant in the room which is only just being addressed so let's see what ideas the US comes up with.

Gilles Dorronsoro June 2011
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/15/afghanistan-impossible-transition/1yp
A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States–led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners

Afghanistan; Lessons Learned study by RAND

Improving U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

Lessons Learned from Afghanistan - 2008 - Seth Jones

DJ COMMENT:
A great piece of work by RAND. It is interesting that it was published in 2008 the year I was preparing to move back to Afghanistan. My conclusion at the time, and still is, is that we should have concentrated on winning the peace in the north not the 'war' in the south. 'Reinforce success and starve failure' as Sun Tzu put it. Seth and the Obama administration came to the opposite conclusion. I just wonder what Afghanistan would look like now if we'd spent $120 billion on development in the north rather than on the war in the south.

I also think there should be more on building support for the government by creating jobs and economic opportunity.  But aside from those personal observations it is a comprehensive review of recent counter insurgency operations and the relevant lessons for Afghanistan. COMMENT ENDS.


From the RAND website

In an effort to better understand the insurgency and its causes, the RAND Corporation conducted an exhaustive set of primary source interviews in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and Europe (including multiple visits to Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008); reviewed relevant government documents; and examined the literature on 90 insurgencies since 1945 to identify factors that can be correlated with success and failure.

What Variables Are Key to Counterinsurgency Success or Failure?

Based on the examination of 90 insurgencies since World War II, RAND found two major factors linked with the success (and failure) of past counterinsurgency efforts: (1) the degree of local support for the government and (2) external support for insurgents, including sanctuary.

The study found that governments with high levels of popular support prevailed in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, but they won less than a third of the insurgencies when they had medium or low levels of support. In addition, insurgent groups that enjoyed support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from nonstate actors and diaspora groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. Moreover, sanctuary in neighboring states was particularly important for insurgent groups.

The study identified some initial key steps to counter insurgent support, which are highlighted in the table.

Improving governance

Prosecute corrupt government officials and mid- and high-level drug traffickers; the failure to do so is eroding popular support for the government.

Continue building Afghan security forces, especially increasing police mentors in the field.

Focus on strategic reconstruction projects, such as Kaiaki Dam for electricity, which can provide key services to rural areas.

Ensure secure and successful 2009 democratic elections.

Increasing support to government

Increase the number of U.S./NATO forces by at least 28,000.

Refocus U.S./NATO resources on southern Afganistan.

Decreasing support to insurgents

• Increase pressure on Pakistan to counter the Taliban and end government support for militants.
• Establish a regional dialogue with Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia (reviving the 2001 Bonn approach) toward stabilizing Afghanistan.

The Need for Big Ideas for the Afghan Transition

“A stand can be made against invasions by armies but no stand can be made against invasion by an idea”

Victor Hugo

What is our big idea for Afghanistan? What is the Afghan’s big idea for their own country?

Maybe strategic communications should be about strategic listening so we can find the Afghans with  clear, compelling positive visions of what the country could look like in 2018 after the Transition.

We can help find, articulate and communicate an Afghan vision and then we can support it but it must be an Afghan vision.

My thought on the big idea for the Transition is focus on youth and business.

Afghanistan and the Tea of Fear

I don't know if you've ever read an adventure story and thought, wow that would be great and then had a real adventure and had that horrible sickly feeling in your stomach and wished your life was boring? That was me on the flight out to Afghanistan in 2002. 

As we crossed into Afghan airspace all the lights inside and outside the Hercules aircraft went out.  The pilot informed us we were now in a theatre of war and to stay strapped in as it would be a fast and low tactical landing. The RAF, amongst all their other annoying habits, love to make squaddies sick and this particular pilot certainly didn't want to disappoint.

I had no idea what to expect as we came into land. I was mindful of the briefings about rocket attacks on the airport and the threat of shoulder launched anti aircraft missiles and that an AK-47 was quite capable of putting holes straight through the Herc. I had a moment of deliberation about whether I should sit on my helmet like in Apocolypse Now. Head or balls, head or balls. It's a really tough decision when you actually have to make it and in the end indecision won out and the helmet stayed on my head.

I was also trying to figure out in the pitch black where the crate with all our weapons might be and how I'd get it open as the ramp came down and the Taliban onslaught began. I wasn't so concerned about putting down effective fire as being able to top myself to save me from being skinned alive and buggered as the Russian prisoners reportedly were.

Adventure, I decided, was something best read about.

“30 seconds”

“10”

“Brace, brace, brace”

The rollercoaster was over and the wheels were down. The deceleration was intense and then, like any other flight in the world, we taxied. A long, sauntering taxi. In a soft skinned aircraft. In Afghanistan. Surrounded by Taliban who wanted to bugger and skin me. And not particularly in that order. And I couldn't even ‘blow out my brains’ as recommended by Kipling.

Eventually after two or three hours, or maybe minutes, the aircraft stopped and the rear ramp started to come down. We could see figures coming towards us in the gloom.

“All right fellas?” A Scouser. A jovial, chubby (RAF obviously) Scouser. Thank god for Liverpool. “Welcome to Kabul.”

And so began my first, extraordinary, experience of Afghanistan.

For me the highlight of my tour was the foot patrols.

For every patrol we would all carry full chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear warfare suits, respirators, gloves, over-boots and decontamination kits – remember the anthrax letters in the US in 2001 when we thought Al Qaida was on the brink of unleashing WMD on us all? We carried 24 hours worth of rations, two litres of water, 180 rounds of ammunition in 6 magazines as well as bandoleers of spare rounds and spare link for the 5.56mm Minimi machine guns of which we had two per section. The section commander and the second in command had smoke grenades, flares, night sights and patrol radios. There were two grenadiers with high explosive grenades and a couple of LAWs, Light Anti-tank Weapons. As we were doing 'hearts and minds this, hearts and minds that, Northern Ireland, blah-blah-blah' we wore our body armour under our shirts soft patrol hats on our heads and carried our helmets in our patrol sacks so we didn't look threatening....

At the assigned hour we'd line up by the gate in a herringbone formation with each rifleman facing left and right alternately to cover the left and right arcs of fire. One by one we'd 'hard target' out of the gate running zig-zag for the first 100 metres or so, or as much as we could manage with 35 kilos of kit at 6,000ft altitude in 45 degree heat. [Hats off to the lads in Helmand who have to do this for real, with more kit and more heat.] The cigarette seller / Iranian intelligence officer across the street no doubt logged us in and out but other than that it was just us and the mad dogs out in the noon day sun.

And so the patrols would begin.

We were based on the outskirts of Kabul near the airport. To our west were a number of scattered villages and most of our patrols would concentrate on them. We'd move quite slowly and tactically, visually covering our arcs of fire with our weapons in the low port (held into the shoulder but pointing at the ground in front of us) rather than fire position (aimed at potential targets), hearts and minds remember.

Soon after we first stepped into the maze of mud bricked walled streets where the villages began we'd have our first encounter with the fabled and feared Afghan people. “Hey Mr. how are you?” “Hey Mr. Pen. Dollar. Biscuit.” The kids would surround us, want to play football with us, look through our weapons sights and have their picture taken. “Hey Mr. Axe. Axe” Axe, meaning picture, was probably the first Dari word I learnt.

“Hey Mr. You porridge wog.”

“Excuse me!”

“You porridge wog. Give me pen.”

The Paras who, as always, had been the first in had decided it hilarious to teach the kids the finer points of the English language and rehearse suitable greetings for the anticipated Scotch battlegroup.

Further into the villages with a suitable entourage of kids in tow we'd begin to meet the adults. Invariably they would want to talk to us.

“Chai mekhoride? Chai?”

“Zero Bravo this is Bravo Four Nine. I think we have a local trying to pass us some intel. Send up the 'terp. Over”

Most of the interpreters were young and liked to humour us by wearing body armour and maybe carrying a can of Coke in lieu of rations in deference to our encumbered state. When we did tactical halts they would squat down next to us whilst we took up fire positions in drainage ditches and lying pressed in against tree trunks. Abdul was in his sixties and had been working at the University as a professor, he would walk along beside us in his brown suit, white Islamic cap with his hands clasped firmly behind his back clutching his prayer beads. When we went to ground he seemingly stood alone in an empty field contemplating the sky and no doubt thinking “Oh dear! Here we go again.”

“Tea.”

“What?”

“He's asking if you would like some tea.”

“Erm. Zero Bravo this is Bravo Four Nine. We're being invited for tea. I think it might be a trap. Over.”

“Bravo Four Nine this is Zero Bravo. Had intel on ricin plot. No tea. Over”

“Roger. Out.”

“Tell him thank you but we've just had a brew before we left.”

And then we'd meet the next local.

“Chai mekhoride?”

“What?”

“Tea. He's asking if you would like to be his guest and drink tea with him.”

“Why?”

“The people are very pleased you are here and that you have made the Taliban leave.”

“Does everyone want us to drink tea with them?”

“Yes. In Islam hospitality is very important. If you are our guest we will provide you with tea, food and somewhere to stay. If you are our enemy... Well that is a different matter.”

“Zero Bravo, erm, I think one of us should drink tea with them. The rest of us can be on guard. What do you think? Over.”

“Bravo Four Nine. That's a negative. Could be a contagious biological agent that takes us all out. Out.”

“OK Abdul. Would you mind telling him thank you very much perhaps another time.”

And so I'd spend a lot of my time on patrol chatting to Abdul, or the other interpreters and as many of the locals as I possibly could. As I was an 'Attachment' to the patrol and not strictly part of the fighting force I was given significant latitude. When the guys were doing a tactical halt and taking up fire positions behind walls I, with Abdul, could stand and chat with the locals.

“So what do you need here?”

“Water. We have no water. The wells are dry. Six years of drought. We need deeper wells.”

“OK. I think we should be able to help with that. I'll see what we can do.”

If you had a dollar for every time an Afghan has heard that and then nothing happened you'd be as rich as some of the thousands of development contractors living in compounds in Kabul.

I tried various different avenues to try and get some wells into the local village but with absolutely no success. As a very junior rank in a big organization in a multi-national, multi-agency environment my request for a drop of water got lost in the tidal wave of need. And so I had to go back out on patrol and look those Afghans in the eye and say ‘I’m sorry there’s nothing we can do.’ It was one of the most painful and obviously untrue things I’ve ever had to say in my life. After all if we could fly an entire battlegroup half way round the world we could certainly dig a hole.

By the end of my tour and the end of 2002 the honeymoon was obviously coming to an end. The villagers had given up inviting us for tea or asking for wells. They discontented themselves with the four mile round trip to the nearest source of water. The kids were less keen to play football or look through our weapon sights and every now and then they’d throw stones at the open sided Land Rovers, especially if one of them had been recently knocked down by a speeding military convoy.

I left Afghanistan with two really strong impressions. The first was of the overwhelming hospitality and generosity of the Afghan people who had absolutely nothing to give but tea and bread but offered it anyway. I developed a deep respect for the Afghan people and a love this extraordinary country where the sense of optimism and possibility was so palpable you could almost see it hanging in the air. The second was watching and being part of the institutions of the international community effectively landing on the moon with a corporate sense of fear and desperately looking for reference points, systems, processes or institutions they could recognise and work with and being completely befuddled. Afghanistan is like nowhere else in the World. Finding nothing we understood, recognised or weren’t afraid of, even tea, we set about the mammoth and frankly sacrilegious task of making Afghanistan more like the rest of the world.

So largely through fear and institutional ignorance we missed the opportunity to drink tea, dig wells and learn about Afghanistan. Instead we determined ourselves to stay within our burgeoning blast walls, write policies and spend huge sums establishing the institutions that would teach the Afghans how to be more like us.

Despite the pervading institutional sense of doom surrounding Afghanistan I still retain the sense of optimism that pervaded my first (and second) military tour. Afghanistan is a personal and social, not institutional, environment. I now live and work amongst the Afghan people and once you step away from the armour, heavy machine guns and blast walls you can still find those kind, generous and welcoming Afghans who greeted us in 2002. There is still every opportunity for a successful outcome in Afghanistan but I believe it will come from focusing our energies on areas where we can make more friends not kill more enemies.

The Fulcrum Strategy, the Opium Economy and the Afghan Transition

The Fulcrum Strategy - first written Feb. 2006

This blog explains why opium in Afghanistan is an economic not law enforcement issue. It presents a pragmatic strategy for countering narcotics by providing alternative licit investment opportunities to Afghanistan’s narco entrepreneurs. After all opium still presents the best and safest return on investment available to Afghanistan’s capitalists. It is currently the only industry that has any chance of supporting the Afghan economy once US forces and the war economy withdraw in 2014. Written in 2006 the Fulcrum Strategy has great relevance to the international community’s transition because opium is the fulcrum upon which the Afghan economy and hence the nation will turn.

“Forceful poppy eradication without adequate alternative livelihood

assistance can alienate the poor farmer and strengthen narcotraffickers.

Such quick fix solutions will push many rural communities

into further poverty and dependency on terrorists.”

T. Jawad – Afghan Ambassador to the US

Fulcrum – 1 the point against which a lever is placed to get a purchase or

on which it turns or is supported. 2 the means by which influence etc. is

brought to bear.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary

About The Author

David James was awarded the Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service for his innovative and successful counter narcotics strategies in Afghanistan in 2004/5.

“Through his efforts and his efforts alone he has opened doors and built bridges that not only greatly assisted [Counter Narcotics] operations in theatre, but also were one of the main contributing factors to their success.”

QCVS nomination.

The Fulcrum Strategy was written as a public service with the intent of providing new ideas for those involved in writing and implementing counter narcotics strategies for Afghanistan.

Context

The socio-political environment in rural Afghanistan is not

dissimilar to feudal England in the Middle Ages. For most people

the only form of law and order, institutions, infrastructure, and

employment are provided by a complex hierarchy of tribal

leaders, commanders and warlords. It is in the hands of these

men that the fate of the nation lies and it is these men that the

Fulcrum Strategy is concerned with.

These men are, amongst other things, Afghanistan’s business

leaders and they operate in an unregulated free market economy.

Within this environment opium offers the safest and most

profitable investment available. For the narco-entrepreneurs and

peasant farmers alike counter narcotics activities are an

unavoidable occupational hazard. Unavoidable because there is

currently no viable alternative industry capable of producing the

equivalent of 50% of licit GDP that opium trading represents.

Drugs are described by President Karzai as “…the single greatest

challenge to the long term security, development and effective

governance of Afghanistan”. Despite four years of Counter

Narcotics efforts opium production in 2006 is likely to be a record

high.

Summary of Counter Narcotic Activities

• Taliban reduce opium production by 94% in alleged secret deal

with UK and US (2001)

• Britain becomes lead nation for counter narcotic activities in

Afghanistan (2002)

• British cash for voluntary eradication “a total failure” (2002)

• Governor lead eradication hampered by corruption (2003)

• UK helps Afghan Government write the National Drug

Control Strategy.

• Some NGOs return US funds for Alternative Livelihoods

claiming the concept was unworkable (2003)

• Opium production back up to 4,200 metric tonnes. US

suggests UK CN effort is “going wobbly” (2004)

• Alleged aerial spraying in Nangahar leads to illness and

environmental damage. UK & US deny involvement (2004)

• US only manage to eradicate 200 hectares of poppy for total

cost $50 million (2005)

• Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit set up (2005)

• Afghan Special Narcotics Force raid Bahram Chah (2005)

• Criminal Justice Task Force begins first of 170 narco-related

prosecutions (2005)

• Updated National Drug Control Strategy launched (2006)

• British troops deploy to Helmand as NATO takes over from

the US (2006)

Alternative Livelihoods are the Key

Successful eradication and interdiction operations have a

negative impact on the local economy, which if not addressed

through alternative livelihood provision will lead to destitution,

resentment and a breeding ground for insurgency.

The Department for International Development currently supports

a number of Alternative Livelihood schemes including the

National Rural Access Programme, the National Solidarity

Programme, a Micro-finance programme, crop substitution

research and cash-for-work schemes. 70% of the funding is

provided via the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen

national institutions and develop a sense of ownership.

However these schemes are predominantly aimed at the peasant

farmer, and those low down in the economic spectrum,

completely missing the point that it is entrepreneurs that drive the

economy.

The Fulcrum Strategy suggests that given an alternative, legal,

investment opportunity which provided similar returns to narcotics

combined with an increased threat to their narcotics interests

narco-entrepreneurs could be persuaded to abandon the drugs

trade. This new investment could begin to establish new, legal

economic growth.

Macroeconomic Benefits of Narcotics

The World Bank recognises that narcotics provide the

following benefits to Afghanistan:

• Accounts for 1/3 of all economic activity

• Major source of demand for services, goods and

construction

• Income and livelihoods for a large number of people

• Generates half a billion dollars a year for farmers

• Generates several hundred million dollars for labourers

• Supports a battered rural economy

• Supports balance of payments to produce a net surplus

• Supports the Afghan currency

• Imports from drug proceeds generate significant

amounts of customs revenue

An Introduction to the Fulcrum Strategy

The turning point, or fulcrum, for the counter narcotics effort is the

actions of key narco-entrepreneurs. The Fulcrum Strategy aims

to change the investment decisions of these narco-entrepreneurs

through perception management.

It is a strategic error to target all narco-entrepreneurs in the same

way. Just as post war Germany needed former Nazi’s and Iraq

needed former Ba’athists; Afghanistan will need former narco-

entrepreneurs to rebuild the nation. The Fulcrum Strategy aims

to identify those narco-entrepreneurs that broadly support the

aims of the government and provide them with an alternative

investment opportunity, whilst targeting the drugs infrastructure of

those that oppose the government. This strategy allows counter

narcotics activities to augment the wider objectives of increasing

stability through countering insurgency and terrorism.

Currently there is a desperate need for improved infrastructure

throughout the country. The international community has

pledged money to re-build the country but a lack of financial

institutions and physical security, particularly in the regions,

means these schemes are expensive and slow.

The Fulcrum Strategy looks to develop a win, win, win outcome

where the international community, Afghanistan and the narco-

entrepreneurs gain from a mutually beneficial undertaking.

A Drugs War in Helmand?

Taliban information operations have outperformed the UK’s in

Helmand and they have sold the perception that British troops

are there to destroy the opium industry. In response the British

must rapidly break into the decision making process of key narco-

entrepreneurs and draw them back towards the civic process

before they galvanise into a widespread anti-British alliance and

throw their massive resources into all out war to protect their

trade. With the availability of cheap disgruntled opium farmers,

international jihadists, advanced improvised explosive devices

and suicide bombers it is possible that an alliance of narco-

entrepreneurs could field a force capable of taking on and beating

the 600 British combat troops in a prolonged insurgency.

A drugs war would be catastrophic to Afghanistan’s development.

Key Concept of the Fulcrum Strategy

The key concept of the Fulcrum Strategy is to provide selected

narco-entrepreneurs with the opportunity to become legitimate

businessmen through the provision of lucrative infrastructure

building contracts. The scheme would work as follows:

• The perceived risk to the narcotics industry is increased

through Information and Interdiction Operations.

• Selected narco-entrepreneurs are offered contracts by the

government to build infrastructure projects, such as roads,

using their own money and at their own risk. It is important

that these investment opportunities make economic sense

and are more attractive than investing in narcotics.

• Once the project is verified as complete the (narco)-

entrepreneur is paid a fee which provides a profit comparable

to narcotics trading.

• The fee is taxed at source by the government providing, for

the first time, legitimate revenue from economic activity in the

regions.

• Maintenance contracts will be available to maintain the

project.

Finance for the infrastructure projects is to be provided to the

government by the International Community.

As the scheme progresses through a number of cycles the

acceptance criteria for entrepreneurs bidding for contracts should

become stricter, such as a public renunciation of narcotics and

insurgency.

Integrated Counter Narcotics Operations

To dovetail the transition from narcotics to legitimate economic

activity this scheme should be rolled out one area at a time with

the level of counter narcotic operations gradually increasing as

the economy tips away from illicit business.

It is recommended that counter narcotics operations are

implemented in the following order:

Support and influence – government security forces go into the

community to gather a better understanding of the narcotics

industry and the needs and concerns of the local population.

Information Operations – gradually increasing the perceived

risk to narcotics activities whilst increasing the perceived benefit

of investing in licit business.

Interdiction Operations – initially implemented for perception

management without impacting too heavily on the economy. As

the licit economy improves interdiction operations should aim to

destroy the narcotics infrastructure of those that oppose the

reforms or are a threat to security. In the final phases interdiction

operations will aim to render inoperable key nodes in the

narcotics system such as major bazaars and trafficking routes.

Eradication – once the licit economy is deemed robust enough

and the majority of the population have turned against the drug

trade the entire opium crop would be destroyed. Eradication

must be preceded by public consultation and information

operations.

Benefits

• In fiscal terms the FULCRUM strategy could mean a

significant proportion of the $2.2 billion gross profit that traffickers

made from trading opium each year could be invested back into

the country rather than into foreign money laundering schemes.

• Because virtually everyone in a position of power is involved

in the drug trade, counter narcotics operations can be used to

selectively target anyone who is having a destabilising influence.

• The economy is moved in a controlled manner from narcotics

to licit business with the support of local business leaders and the

wider population.

• Infrastructure projects are labour intensive, thus providing

local employment and they provide stimulus for other economic

activities.

• The strategy also involves a significant degree of institution

and infrastructure building completed with minimal risk to the

government and International Community.

• (Narco)-entrepreneurs that take up lucrative building and

maintenance contracts become dependent on the government for

their livelihood giving them a vested interest in supporting the

government’s objectives.

A Pragmatic Approach

The main argument against the Fulcrum Strategy is that it is

providing a money-laundering scheme for drug traffickers.

However this scheme not only launders drugs money but also the

traffickers themselves, they stop being drug dealers and become

legitimate businessmen.

The international community already does a lot of business with

major drug traffickers; they are the politicians, governors and

military commanders they interact with on a daily basis.

Narcotics must be regarded as a disease to be treated rather

than an enemy to be fought, the last thing Afghanistan needs is a

full-blown drugs war.

Conclusion

The Fulcrum Strategy is a radical yet pragmatic approach to the series of interlinked

complex problems that keep Afghanistan dependent on the narcotics industry. The Fulcrum

Strategy deals with the cause rather than the symptoms of the narcotics malaise and takes

the approach of a drug cure rather than a drug war.

A ten phase implementation plan is available to appropriate parties upon request.

Feedback is really important for the further development of this strategy. Please contact David at:

davidjamesemail@googlemail.com

Afghanistan; Enterprise for Peace

What?

Developing and implementing a new marketing strategy to make Afghan goods competitive on the global market.

Why?

Insurgency & terrorism require a recruiting pool and at least the tacit support of a significant portion of the population. People with jobs and businesses have something to lose and will make a stand against those that threaten their livelihoods.

According to international military and law enforcement organizations engaged in Afghanistan the country requires a 170,000 strong national army and a 134,000 strong police force to provide security. Even without other public expenditures such as basic healthcare provision, education and infrastructure development Afghanistan doesn’t, and won’t for the foreseeable future, have a tax base to pay for it. Therefore the Afghan government will be dependent, focused and accountable to their international donors and not the taxpaying Afghan electorate.

You want democracy? Then get the electorate to pay the bills. They will hold the government to account.

Additionally it is only a matter of time until international dollars get focused elsewhere and without a tax base the government will collapse. Building the Afghan economy is vital for the transiton.

Opium accounts for a third of Afghanistan’s GDP. Afghanistan is the second least developed country in the world. The economic and social impact of eradication prior to the establishment of alternative livelihoods will fuel discontent and the insurgency.

Those involved in opium do so because it provides them the best opportunity to improve their financial situation. Given a more lucrative alternative – along with increasing the risk to involvement in the opium trade – those involved would have a simple decision to make; ‘Do I want to earn more money, or do I want to risk jail/ruin?’

The opium trade demonstrates that Afghans are capable of organizing and running vertically integrated businesses with complex supply, finance and distribution systems to meet a global demand.

What is required is a new global demand for licit Afghan products.

Why Aren’t Current Interventions Working

Too much development effort has been focused on what Afghans can produce not what they can sell. No market, no point.

Afghan goods are of a poorer quality and more expensive than the equivalent products from other developing nations. Competing on a commodity (price/quality) basis is not viable.

The only way to become price competitive in a Global hyper-competitive market would be massive long term investment in infrastructure, training, education, communications, finance and building investor confidence. Even in more favorable economic conditions the international community’s governments could not invest enough, fast enough to make Afghan goods competitive against private sector investment in countries like India, China and Brazil.

Even if the long term investment were possible Afghanistan is a landlocked country surrounded by nations with their own security, economic and infrastructure issues.

So What is the Solution?

Building the Afghan mark and associated brands with enough brand equity to negate the price and quality disadvantage.

This means building brands that consumers will pay more for than the unbranded equivalent.

An example is the Swiss mark and Tag Heuer watches and Lindt chocolate.

This may not appear to be a good example because the Swiss mark is based on high quality design and engineering.

But if you imagine the Afghan mark to be built around history, tradition, exploration, the exotic, the rare, the unique you can see the potential.

Afghanistan has considerable untapped brand potential with the opportunity to leverage well known icons such as:

·         Alexander the Great

·         Marco Polo

·         The Great Game

·         The works and characters of Rudyard Kippling

·         The Hindu Kush mountains

·         The Silk Road

·         The death mask of Tutankhamen (made from Afghan lapis lazuli)

·         The Buddhas at Bamiyan

Consumers will pay above the odds for something special. Something no one else has. Something that can start, or stop, conversations.

Are you more likely to be the centre of the dinner party conversation by wearing the latest necklace from Versace or the Hindu Kush?

With the right strategy and execution it would only take Angelina Jolie to attend the latest premier wearing an Afghan necklace to make them the ‘must-have’ A-list accessory.

Made in Afghanistan - Re-positioning Afghan products in the minds of consumers.

Currently there is a media created perception amongst the public in the US and other western nations that we are at war with Afghanistan, not helping the Afghan’s defeat the Taliban and build a better future.

If that’s the perception why would anyone want to buy or be associated with Afghan goods?

But what if you knew that by buying Afghan goods you’d save the lives of our troops and get them home sooner? That you’d have to pay less tax. That you could play a vital part in getting the Afghans standing on their own two feet so that they wouldn’t need handouts. That you could help stop the violence, the extremism, the threat to your own security.

That’s much easier to sell.

Pay more for Afghan dried fruit but pay less tax.

Buy an Afghan carpet so your son doesn’t have to serve in the same place as your husband in five years time.

How?

·         Identify Afghan products with the potential to compete in the international market – low bulk, high value and robust. Carpets,  jewelry and dried fruit have already been identified but what else is there? We understand that a number of organizations have already carried out this vital work which we could draw upon.

·         Identifying markets for Afghan products – military towns, A-list celebrities (and wannabes), creative communities, small businesses selling ethnic and fair trade goods and readers of ‘Three Cups of Tea’ for example.

·         Matching the product to the market and building the right brand endorsed by the Afghan mark. Example: Greg Mortenson’s new book ‘Stones into Schools’ is focused on the Wakhan in north east Afghanistan. There is a NGO project teaching the local women to make jewelry in the area. It would not be difficult to develop a brand and marketing strategy to sell this jewelry to the millions of Greg’s readers, especially if he endorsed it….

·         Changing the news. The mainstream media has already decided Afghanistan is a lost cause and are doing what they can to make the story a reality. However there are scores of local media, specialist publications and online outlets who would love quirky, well produced, stories of exotic products, local heroes and the latest thing. These can be as diverse as fashion, farming, business, history, travel, foreign policy and educational magazines, websites, radio and TV outlets.

Example: The story of a girl taught at one of Greg Mortenson’s schools has graduated and is now undergoing vocational training in jewelry design and manufacture. She has just sold her first piece to the US Ambassador’s wife who will wear it to the opening of…. Great story, great pictures. Might not make the front page of the Washington Post but it could be a multi-page spread in Cosmopolitan.

·         Building international small business to small business relationships. Afghanistan is a small business environment. Building large enterprises is difficult because of the limitations of infrastructure, communications and the instability of relationships between stakeholders.

We would propose that linking small businesses in Afghanistan with small, specialist retail outlets in the US and other developed nations would be the best method of building a viable distribution channel. This would help build and maintain the Afghan mark of rarity and uniqueness.

Additionally it would be the perfect way of breaking down barriers and building relationships between the people of the US (and other nations) and Afghanistan. The two peoples would have a common interest and shared goals.

·         Strategic, Focused and Effective Donor Support. We can build a demand but the Afghans must be able to meet it in the right quality, quantity, timeframe and price. To do this businesses identified by the marketing strategy will need support to improve their business functions, particularly product design, quality control, finance and distribution.  By focusing support on those businesses where there is already an identified market; donor investment will be supporting something that will grow and become self-sustaining. One small, high profile, success could be enough to build investor interest and confidence. Strategic success is always delivered at the tactical level.

Turning a Concept into Reality

The next step towards turning this concept into a successful reality is a short research, analysis and strategy development project.

'A stand can be made against mighty armies but not an idea whose time has come'. Victor Hugo