Thursday, 7 July 2011

Afghanistan and the Tea of Fear

I don't know if you've ever read an adventure story and thought, wow that would be great and then had a real adventure and had that horrible sickly feeling in your stomach and wished your life was boring? That was me on the flight out to Afghanistan in 2002. 

As we crossed into Afghan airspace all the lights inside and outside the Hercules aircraft went out.  The pilot informed us we were now in a theatre of war and to stay strapped in as it would be a fast and low tactical landing. The RAF, amongst all their other annoying habits, love to make squaddies sick and this particular pilot certainly didn't want to disappoint.

I had no idea what to expect as we came into land. I was mindful of the briefings about rocket attacks on the airport and the threat of shoulder launched anti aircraft missiles and that an AK-47 was quite capable of putting holes straight through the Herc. I had a moment of deliberation about whether I should sit on my helmet like in Apocolypse Now. Head or balls, head or balls. It's a really tough decision when you actually have to make it and in the end indecision won out and the helmet stayed on my head.

I was also trying to figure out in the pitch black where the crate with all our weapons might be and how I'd get it open as the ramp came down and the Taliban onslaught began. I wasn't so concerned about putting down effective fire as being able to top myself to save me from being skinned alive and buggered as the Russian prisoners reportedly were.

Adventure, I decided, was something best read about.

“30 seconds”

“10”

“Brace, brace, brace”

The rollercoaster was over and the wheels were down. The deceleration was intense and then, like any other flight in the world, we taxied. A long, sauntering taxi. In a soft skinned aircraft. In Afghanistan. Surrounded by Taliban who wanted to bugger and skin me. And not particularly in that order. And I couldn't even ‘blow out my brains’ as recommended by Kipling.

Eventually after two or three hours, or maybe minutes, the aircraft stopped and the rear ramp started to come down. We could see figures coming towards us in the gloom.

“All right fellas?” A Scouser. A jovial, chubby (RAF obviously) Scouser. Thank god for Liverpool. “Welcome to Kabul.”

And so began my first, extraordinary, experience of Afghanistan.

For me the highlight of my tour was the foot patrols.

For every patrol we would all carry full chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear warfare suits, respirators, gloves, over-boots and decontamination kits – remember the anthrax letters in the US in 2001 when we thought Al Qaida was on the brink of unleashing WMD on us all? We carried 24 hours worth of rations, two litres of water, 180 rounds of ammunition in 6 magazines as well as bandoleers of spare rounds and spare link for the 5.56mm Minimi machine guns of which we had two per section. The section commander and the second in command had smoke grenades, flares, night sights and patrol radios. There were two grenadiers with high explosive grenades and a couple of LAWs, Light Anti-tank Weapons. As we were doing 'hearts and minds this, hearts and minds that, Northern Ireland, blah-blah-blah' we wore our body armour under our shirts soft patrol hats on our heads and carried our helmets in our patrol sacks so we didn't look threatening....

At the assigned hour we'd line up by the gate in a herringbone formation with each rifleman facing left and right alternately to cover the left and right arcs of fire. One by one we'd 'hard target' out of the gate running zig-zag for the first 100 metres or so, or as much as we could manage with 35 kilos of kit at 6,000ft altitude in 45 degree heat. [Hats off to the lads in Helmand who have to do this for real, with more kit and more heat.] The cigarette seller / Iranian intelligence officer across the street no doubt logged us in and out but other than that it was just us and the mad dogs out in the noon day sun.

And so the patrols would begin.

We were based on the outskirts of Kabul near the airport. To our west were a number of scattered villages and most of our patrols would concentrate on them. We'd move quite slowly and tactically, visually covering our arcs of fire with our weapons in the low port (held into the shoulder but pointing at the ground in front of us) rather than fire position (aimed at potential targets), hearts and minds remember.

Soon after we first stepped into the maze of mud bricked walled streets where the villages began we'd have our first encounter with the fabled and feared Afghan people. “Hey Mr. how are you?” “Hey Mr. Pen. Dollar. Biscuit.” The kids would surround us, want to play football with us, look through our weapons sights and have their picture taken. “Hey Mr. Axe. Axe” Axe, meaning picture, was probably the first Dari word I learnt.

“Hey Mr. You porridge wog.”

“Excuse me!”

“You porridge wog. Give me pen.”

The Paras who, as always, had been the first in had decided it hilarious to teach the kids the finer points of the English language and rehearse suitable greetings for the anticipated Scotch battlegroup.

Further into the villages with a suitable entourage of kids in tow we'd begin to meet the adults. Invariably they would want to talk to us.

“Chai mekhoride? Chai?”

“Zero Bravo this is Bravo Four Nine. I think we have a local trying to pass us some intel. Send up the 'terp. Over”

Most of the interpreters were young and liked to humour us by wearing body armour and maybe carrying a can of Coke in lieu of rations in deference to our encumbered state. When we did tactical halts they would squat down next to us whilst we took up fire positions in drainage ditches and lying pressed in against tree trunks. Abdul was in his sixties and had been working at the University as a professor, he would walk along beside us in his brown suit, white Islamic cap with his hands clasped firmly behind his back clutching his prayer beads. When we went to ground he seemingly stood alone in an empty field contemplating the sky and no doubt thinking “Oh dear! Here we go again.”

“Tea.”

“What?”

“He's asking if you would like some tea.”

“Erm. Zero Bravo this is Bravo Four Nine. We're being invited for tea. I think it might be a trap. Over.”

“Bravo Four Nine this is Zero Bravo. Had intel on ricin plot. No tea. Over”

“Roger. Out.”

“Tell him thank you but we've just had a brew before we left.”

And then we'd meet the next local.

“Chai mekhoride?”

“What?”

“Tea. He's asking if you would like to be his guest and drink tea with him.”

“Why?”

“The people are very pleased you are here and that you have made the Taliban leave.”

“Does everyone want us to drink tea with them?”

“Yes. In Islam hospitality is very important. If you are our guest we will provide you with tea, food and somewhere to stay. If you are our enemy... Well that is a different matter.”

“Zero Bravo, erm, I think one of us should drink tea with them. The rest of us can be on guard. What do you think? Over.”

“Bravo Four Nine. That's a negative. Could be a contagious biological agent that takes us all out. Out.”

“OK Abdul. Would you mind telling him thank you very much perhaps another time.”

And so I'd spend a lot of my time on patrol chatting to Abdul, or the other interpreters and as many of the locals as I possibly could. As I was an 'Attachment' to the patrol and not strictly part of the fighting force I was given significant latitude. When the guys were doing a tactical halt and taking up fire positions behind walls I, with Abdul, could stand and chat with the locals.

“So what do you need here?”

“Water. We have no water. The wells are dry. Six years of drought. We need deeper wells.”

“OK. I think we should be able to help with that. I'll see what we can do.”

If you had a dollar for every time an Afghan has heard that and then nothing happened you'd be as rich as some of the thousands of development contractors living in compounds in Kabul.

I tried various different avenues to try and get some wells into the local village but with absolutely no success. As a very junior rank in a big organization in a multi-national, multi-agency environment my request for a drop of water got lost in the tidal wave of need. And so I had to go back out on patrol and look those Afghans in the eye and say ‘I’m sorry there’s nothing we can do.’ It was one of the most painful and obviously untrue things I’ve ever had to say in my life. After all if we could fly an entire battlegroup half way round the world we could certainly dig a hole.

By the end of my tour and the end of 2002 the honeymoon was obviously coming to an end. The villagers had given up inviting us for tea or asking for wells. They discontented themselves with the four mile round trip to the nearest source of water. The kids were less keen to play football or look through our weapon sights and every now and then they’d throw stones at the open sided Land Rovers, especially if one of them had been recently knocked down by a speeding military convoy.

I left Afghanistan with two really strong impressions. The first was of the overwhelming hospitality and generosity of the Afghan people who had absolutely nothing to give but tea and bread but offered it anyway. I developed a deep respect for the Afghan people and a love this extraordinary country where the sense of optimism and possibility was so palpable you could almost see it hanging in the air. The second was watching and being part of the institutions of the international community effectively landing on the moon with a corporate sense of fear and desperately looking for reference points, systems, processes or institutions they could recognise and work with and being completely befuddled. Afghanistan is like nowhere else in the World. Finding nothing we understood, recognised or weren’t afraid of, even tea, we set about the mammoth and frankly sacrilegious task of making Afghanistan more like the rest of the world.

So largely through fear and institutional ignorance we missed the opportunity to drink tea, dig wells and learn about Afghanistan. Instead we determined ourselves to stay within our burgeoning blast walls, write policies and spend huge sums establishing the institutions that would teach the Afghans how to be more like us.

Despite the pervading institutional sense of doom surrounding Afghanistan I still retain the sense of optimism that pervaded my first (and second) military tour. Afghanistan is a personal and social, not institutional, environment. I now live and work amongst the Afghan people and once you step away from the armour, heavy machine guns and blast walls you can still find those kind, generous and welcoming Afghans who greeted us in 2002. There is still every opportunity for a successful outcome in Afghanistan but I believe it will come from focusing our energies on areas where we can make more friends not kill more enemies.

The Fulcrum Strategy, the Opium Economy and the Afghan Transition

The Fulcrum Strategy - first written Feb. 2006

This blog explains why opium in Afghanistan is an economic not law enforcement issue. It presents a pragmatic strategy for countering narcotics by providing alternative licit investment opportunities to Afghanistan’s narco entrepreneurs. After all opium still presents the best and safest return on investment available to Afghanistan’s capitalists. It is currently the only industry that has any chance of supporting the Afghan economy once US forces and the war economy withdraw in 2014. Written in 2006 the Fulcrum Strategy has great relevance to the international community’s transition because opium is the fulcrum upon which the Afghan economy and hence the nation will turn.


“Forceful poppy eradication without adequate alternative livelihood
assistance can alienate the poor farmer and strengthen narcotraffickers.
Such quick fix solutions will push many rural communities
into further poverty and dependency on terrorists.”
T. Jawad – Afghan Ambassador to the US


Fulcrum – 1 the point against which a lever is placed to get a purchase or
on which it turns or is supported. 2 the means by which influence etc. is
brought to bear.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary
About The Author
David James was awarded the Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service for his innovative and successful counter narcotics strategies in Afghanistan in 2004/5.

“Through his efforts and his efforts alone he has opened doors and built bridges that not only greatly assisted [Counter Narcotics] operations in theatre, but also were one of the main contributing factors to their success.”
QCVS nomination.

The Fulcrum Strategy was written as a public service with the intent of providing new ideas for those involved in writing and implementing counter narcotics strategies for Afghanistan.

Context
The socio-political environment in rural Afghanistan is not
dissimilar to feudal England in the Middle Ages. For most people
the only form of law and order, institutions, infrastructure, and
employment are provided by a complex hierarchy of tribal
leaders, commanders and warlords. It is in the hands of these
men that the fate of the nation lies and it is these men that the
Fulcrum Strategy is concerned with.

These men are, amongst other things, Afghanistan’s business
leaders and they operate in an unregulated free market economy.
Within this environment opium offers the safest and most
profitable investment available. For the narco-entrepreneurs and
peasant farmers alike counter narcotics activities are an
unavoidable occupational hazard. Unavoidable because there is
currently no viable alternative industry capable of producing the
equivalent of 50% of licit GDP that opium trading represents.

Drugs are described by President Karzai as “…the single greatest
challenge to the long term security, development and effective
governance of Afghanistan”. Despite four years of Counter
Narcotics efforts opium production in 2006 is likely to be a record
high.

Summary of Counter Narcotic Activities
Taliban reduce opium production by 94% in alleged secret deal
with UK and US (2001)
Britain becomes lead nation for counter narcotic activities in
Afghanistan (2002)
British cash for voluntary eradication “a total failure” (2002)
Governor lead eradication hampered by corruption (2003)
UK helps Afghan Government write the National Drug
Control Strategy.
Some NGOs return US funds for Alternative Livelihoods
claiming the concept was unworkable (2003)
Opium production back up to 4,200 metric tonnes. US
suggests UK CN effort is “going wobbly” (2004)
Alleged aerial spraying in Nangahar leads to illness and
environmental damage. UK & US deny involvement (2004)
US only manage to eradicate 200 hectares of poppy for total
cost $50 million (2005)
Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit set up (2005)
Afghan Special Narcotics Force raid Bahram Chah (2005)
Criminal Justice Task Force begins first of 170 narco-related
prosecutions (2005)
Updated National Drug Control Strategy launched (2006)
British troops deploy to Helmand as NATO takes over from
the US (2006)

Alternative Livelihoods are the Key
Successful eradication and interdiction operations have a
negative impact on the local economy, which if not addressed
through alternative livelihood provision will lead to destitution,
resentment and a breeding ground for insurgency.

The Department for International Development currently supports
a number of Alternative Livelihood schemes including the
National Rural Access Programme, the National Solidarity
Programme, a Micro-finance programme, crop substitution
research and cash-for-work schemes. 70% of the funding is
provided via the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen
national institutions and develop a sense of ownership.

However these schemes are predominantly aimed at the peasant
farmer, and those low down in the economic spectrum,
completely missing the point that it is entrepreneurs that drive the
economy.

The Fulcrum Strategy suggests that given an alternative, legal,
investment opportunity which provided similar returns to narcotics
combined with an increased threat to their narcotics interests
narco-entrepreneurs could be persuaded to abandon the drugs
trade. This new investment could begin to establish new, legal
economic growth.

Macroeconomic Benefits of Narcotics
The World Bank recognises that narcotics provide the
following benefits to Afghanistan:
Accounts for 1/3 of all economic activity
Major source of demand for services, goods and
construction
Income and livelihoods for a large number of people
Generates half a billion dollars a year for farmers
Generates several hundred million dollars for labourers
Supports a battered rural economy
Supports balance of payments to produce a net surplus
Supports the Afghan currency
Imports from drug proceeds generate significant
amounts of customs revenue

An Introduction to the Fulcrum Strategy
The turning point, or fulcrum, for the counter narcotics effort is the
actions of key narco-entrepreneurs. The Fulcrum Strategy aims
to change the investment decisions of these narco-entrepreneurs
through perception management.

It is a strategic error to target all narco-entrepreneurs in the same
way. Just as post war Germany needed former Nazi’s and Iraq
needed former Ba’athists; Afghanistan will need former narco-
entrepreneurs to rebuild the nation. The Fulcrum Strategy aims
to identify those narco-entrepreneurs that broadly support the
aims of the government and provide them with an alternative
investment opportunity, whilst targeting the drugs infrastructure of
those that oppose the government. This strategy allows counter
narcotics activities to augment the wider objectives of increasing
stability through countering insurgency and terrorism.

Currently there is a desperate need for improved infrastructure
throughout the country. The international community has
pledged money to re-build the country but a lack of financial
institutions and physical security, particularly in the regions,
means these schemes are expensive and slow.
The Fulcrum Strategy looks to develop a win, win, win outcome
where the international community, Afghanistan and the narco-
entrepreneurs gain from a mutually beneficial undertaking.

A Drugs War in Helmand?
Taliban information operations have outperformed the UK’s in
Helmand and they have sold the perception that British troops
are there to destroy the opium industry. In response the British
must rapidly break into the decision making process of key narco-
entrepreneurs and draw them back towards the civic process
before they galvanise into a widespread anti-British alliance and
throw their massive resources into all out war to protect their
trade. With the availability of cheap disgruntled opium farmers,
international jihadists, advanced improvised explosive devices
and suicide bombers it is possible that an alliance of narco-
entrepreneurs could field a force capable of taking on and beating
the 600 British combat troops in a prolonged insurgency.

A drugs war would be catastrophic to Afghanistan’s development.


Key Concept of the Fulcrum Strategy
The key concept of the Fulcrum Strategy is to provide selected
narco-entrepreneurs with the opportunity to become legitimate
businessmen through the provision of lucrative infrastructure
building contracts. The scheme would work as follows:
The perceived risk to the narcotics industry is increased
through Information and Interdiction Operations.
Selected narco-entrepreneurs are offered contracts by the
government to build infrastructure projects, such as roads,
using their own money and at their own risk. It is important
that these investment opportunities make economic sense
and are more attractive than investing in narcotics.
Once the project is verified as complete the (narco)-
entrepreneur is paid a fee which provides a profit comparable
to narcotics trading.
The fee is taxed at source by the government providing, for
the first time, legitimate revenue from economic activity in the
regions.
Maintenance contracts will be available to maintain the
project.

Finance for the infrastructure projects is to be provided to the
government by the International Community.

As the scheme progresses through a number of cycles the
acceptance criteria for entrepreneurs bidding for contracts should
become stricter, such as a public renunciation of narcotics and
insurgency.

Integrated Counter Narcotics Operations
To dovetail the transition from narcotics to legitimate economic
activity this scheme should be rolled out one area at a time with
the level of counter narcotic operations gradually increasing as
the economy tips away from illicit business.

It is recommended that counter narcotics operations are
implemented in the following order:

Support and influence – government security forces go into the
community to gather a better understanding of the narcotics
industry and the needs and concerns of the local population.
Information Operations – gradually increasing the perceived
risk to narcotics activities whilst increasing the perceived benefit
of investing in licit business.
Interdiction Operations – initially implemented for perception
management without impacting too heavily on the economy. As
the licit economy improves interdiction operations should aim to
destroy the narcotics infrastructure of those that oppose the
reforms or are a threat to security. In the final phases interdiction
operations will aim to render inoperable key nodes in the
narcotics system such as major bazaars and trafficking routes.
Eradication – once the licit economy is deemed robust enough
and the majority of the population have turned against the drug
trade the entire opium crop would be destroyed. Eradication
must be preceded by public consultation and information
operations.

Benefits
In fiscal terms the FULCRUM strategy could mean a
significant proportion of the $2.2 billion gross profit that traffickers
made from trading opium each year could be invested back into
the country rather than into foreign money laundering schemes.
Because virtually everyone in a position of power is involved
in the drug trade, counter narcotics operations can be used to
selectively target anyone who is having a destabilising influence.
The economy is moved in a controlled manner from narcotics
to licit business with the support of local business leaders and the
wider population.
Infrastructure projects are labour intensive, thus providing
local employment and they provide stimulus for other economic
activities.
The strategy also involves a significant degree of institution
and infrastructure building completed with minimal risk to the
government and International Community.
(Narco)-entrepreneurs that take up lucrative building and
maintenance contracts become dependent on the government for
their livelihood giving them a vested interest in supporting the
government’s objectives.

A Pragmatic Approach
The main argument against the Fulcrum Strategy is that it is
providing a money-laundering scheme for drug traffickers.

However this scheme not only launders drugs money but also the
traffickers themselves, they stop being drug dealers and become
legitimate businessmen.

The international community already does a lot of business with
major drug traffickers; they are the politicians, governors and
military commanders they interact with on a daily basis.

Narcotics must be regarded as a disease to be treated rather
than an enemy to be fought, the last thing Afghanistan needs is a
full-blown drugs war.

Conclusion
The Fulcrum Strategy is a radical yet pragmatic approach to the series of interlinked
complex problems that keep Afghanistan dependent on the narcotics industry. The Fulcrum
Strategy deals with the cause rather than the symptoms of the narcotics malaise and takes
the approach of a drug cure rather than a drug war.

A ten phase implementation plan is available to appropriate parties upon request.



Feedback is really important for the further development of this strategy. Please contact David at:
davidjamesemail@googlemail.com