This blog explains why opium in Afghanistan is an economic not law enforcement issue. It presents a pragmatic strategy for countering narcotics by providing alternative licit investment opportunities to Afghanistan’s narco entrepreneurs. After all opium still presents the best and safest return on investment available to Afghanistan’s capitalists. It is currently the only industry that has any chance of supporting the Afghan economy once US forces and the war economy withdraw in 2014. Written in 2006 the Fulcrum Strategy has great relevance to the international community’s transition because opium is the fulcrum upon which the Afghan economy and hence the nation will turn.
“Forceful poppy eradication without adequate alternative livelihood
assistance can alienate the poor farmer and strengthen narcotraffickers.
Such quick fix solutions will push many rural communities
into further poverty and dependency on terrorists.”
T. Jawad – Afghan Ambassador to the US
Fulcrum – 1 the point against which a lever is placed to get a purchase or
on which it turns or is supported. 2 the means by which influence etc. is
brought to bear.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary
About The Author
David James was awarded the Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service for his innovative and successful counter narcotics strategies in Afghanistan in 2004/5.
“Through his efforts and his efforts alone he has opened doors and built bridges that not only greatly assisted [Counter Narcotics] operations in theatre, but also were one of the main contributing factors to their success.”
QCVS nomination.
The Fulcrum Strategy was written as a public service with the intent of providing new ideas for those involved in writing and implementing counter narcotics strategies for Afghanistan.
Context
The socio-political environment in rural Afghanistan is not
dissimilar to feudal England in the Middle Ages. For most people
the only form of law and order, institutions, infrastructure, and
employment are provided by a complex hierarchy of tribal
leaders, commanders and warlords. It is in the hands of these
men that the fate of the nation lies and it is these men that the
Fulcrum Strategy is concerned with.
These men are, amongst other things, Afghanistan’s business
leaders and they operate in an unregulated free market economy.
Within this environment opium offers the safest and most
profitable investment available. For the narco-entrepreneurs and
peasant farmers alike counter narcotics activities are an
unavoidable occupational hazard. Unavoidable because there is
currently no viable alternative industry capable of producing the
equivalent of 50% of licit GDP that opium trading represents.
Drugs are described by President Karzai as “…the single greatest
challenge to the long term security, development and effective
governance of Afghanistan”. Despite four years of Counter
Narcotics efforts opium production in 2006 is likely to be a record
high.
Summary of Counter Narcotic Activities
• Taliban reduce opium production by 94% in alleged secret deal
with UK and US (2001)
• Britain becomes lead nation for counter narcotic activities in
Afghanistan (2002)
• British cash for voluntary eradication “a total failure” (2002)
• Governor lead eradication hampered by corruption (2003)
• UK helps Afghan Government write the National Drug
Control Strategy.
• Some NGOs return US funds for Alternative Livelihoods
claiming the concept was unworkable (2003)
• Opium production back up to 4,200 metric tonnes. US
suggests UK CN effort is “going wobbly” (2004)
• Alleged aerial spraying in Nangahar leads to illness and
environmental damage. UK & US deny involvement (2004)
• US only manage to eradicate 200 hectares of poppy for total
cost $50 million (2005)
• Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit set up (2005)
• Afghan Special Narcotics Force raid Bahram Chah (2005)
• Criminal Justice Task Force begins first of 170 narco-related
prosecutions (2005)
• Updated National Drug Control Strategy launched (2006)
• British troops deploy to Helmand as NATO takes over from
the US (2006)
Alternative Livelihoods are the Key
Successful eradication and interdiction operations have a
negative impact on the local economy, which if not addressed
through alternative livelihood provision will lead to destitution,
resentment and a breeding ground for insurgency.
The Department for International Development currently supports
a number of Alternative Livelihood schemes including the
National Rural Access Programme, the National Solidarity
Programme, a Micro-finance programme, crop substitution
research and cash-for-work schemes. 70% of the funding is
provided via the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen
national institutions and develop a sense of ownership.
However these schemes are predominantly aimed at the peasant
farmer, and those low down in the economic spectrum,
completely missing the point that it is entrepreneurs that drive the
economy.
The Fulcrum Strategy suggests that given an alternative, legal,
investment opportunity which provided similar returns to narcotics
combined with an increased threat to their narcotics interests
narco-entrepreneurs could be persuaded to abandon the drugs
trade. This new investment could begin to establish new, legal
economic growth.
Macroeconomic Benefits of Narcotics
The World Bank recognises that narcotics provide the
following benefits to Afghanistan:
• Accounts for 1/3 of all economic activity
• Major source of demand for services, goods and
construction
• Income and livelihoods for a large number of people
• Generates half a billion dollars a year for farmers
• Generates several hundred million dollars for labourers
• Supports a battered rural economy
• Supports balance of payments to produce a net surplus
• Supports the Afghan currency
• Imports from drug proceeds generate significant
amounts of customs revenue
An Introduction to the Fulcrum Strategy
The turning point, or fulcrum, for the counter narcotics effort is the
actions of key narco-entrepreneurs. The Fulcrum Strategy aims
to change the investment decisions of these narco-entrepreneurs
through perception management.
It is a strategic error to target all narco-entrepreneurs in the same
way. Just as post war Germany needed former Nazi’s and Iraq
needed former Ba’athists; Afghanistan will need former narco-
entrepreneurs to rebuild the nation. The Fulcrum Strategy aims
to identify those narco-entrepreneurs that broadly support the
aims of the government and provide them with an alternative
investment opportunity, whilst targeting the drugs infrastructure of
those that oppose the government. This strategy allows counter
narcotics activities to augment the wider objectives of increasing
stability through countering insurgency and terrorism.
Currently there is a desperate need for improved infrastructure
throughout the country. The international community has
pledged money to re-build the country but a lack of financial
institutions and physical security, particularly in the regions,
means these schemes are expensive and slow.
The Fulcrum Strategy looks to develop a win, win, win outcome
where the international community, Afghanistan and the narco-
entrepreneurs gain from a mutually beneficial undertaking.
A Drugs War in Helmand?
Taliban information operations have outperformed the UK’s in
Helmand and they have sold the perception that British troops
are there to destroy the opium industry. In response the British
must rapidly break into the decision making process of key narco-
entrepreneurs and draw them back towards the civic process
before they galvanise into a widespread anti-British alliance and
throw their massive resources into all out war to protect their
trade. With the availability of cheap disgruntled opium farmers,
international jihadists, advanced improvised explosive devices
and suicide bombers it is possible that an alliance of narco-
entrepreneurs could field a force capable of taking on and beating
the 600 British combat troops in a prolonged insurgency.
A drugs war would be catastrophic to Afghanistan’s development.
Key Concept of the Fulcrum Strategy
The key concept of the Fulcrum Strategy is to provide selected
narco-entrepreneurs with the opportunity to become legitimate
businessmen through the provision of lucrative infrastructure
building contracts. The scheme would work as follows:
• The perceived risk to the narcotics industry is increased
through Information and Interdiction Operations.
• Selected narco-entrepreneurs are offered contracts by the
government to build infrastructure projects, such as roads,
using their own money and at their own risk. It is important
that these investment opportunities make economic sense
and are more attractive than investing in narcotics.
• Once the project is verified as complete the (narco)-
entrepreneur is paid a fee which provides a profit comparable
to narcotics trading.
• The fee is taxed at source by the government providing, for
the first time, legitimate revenue from economic activity in the
regions.
• Maintenance contracts will be available to maintain the
project.
Finance for the infrastructure projects is to be provided to the
government by the International Community.
As the scheme progresses through a number of cycles the
acceptance criteria for entrepreneurs bidding for contracts should
become stricter, such as a public renunciation of narcotics and
insurgency.
Integrated Counter Narcotics Operations
To dovetail the transition from narcotics to legitimate economic
activity this scheme should be rolled out one area at a time with
the level of counter narcotic operations gradually increasing as
the economy tips away from illicit business.
It is recommended that counter narcotics operations are
implemented in the following order:
Support and influence – government security forces go into the
community to gather a better understanding of the narcotics
industry and the needs and concerns of the local population.
Information Operations – gradually increasing the perceived
risk to narcotics activities whilst increasing the perceived benefit
of investing in licit business.
Interdiction Operations – initially implemented for perception
management without impacting too heavily on the economy. As
the licit economy improves interdiction operations should aim to
destroy the narcotics infrastructure of those that oppose the
reforms or are a threat to security. In the final phases interdiction
operations will aim to render inoperable key nodes in the
narcotics system such as major bazaars and trafficking routes.
Eradication – once the licit economy is deemed robust enough
and the majority of the population have turned against the drug
trade the entire opium crop would be destroyed. Eradication
must be preceded by public consultation and information
operations.
Benefits
significant proportion of the $2.2 billion gross profit that traffickers
made from trading opium each year could be invested back into
the country rather than into foreign money laundering schemes.
• Because virtually everyone in a position of power is involved
in the drug trade, counter narcotics operations can be used to
selectively target anyone who is having a destabilising influence.
• The economy is moved in a controlled manner from narcotics
to licit business with the support of local business leaders and the
wider population.
• Infrastructure projects are labour intensive, thus providing
local employment and they provide stimulus for other economic
activities.
• The strategy also involves a significant degree of institution
and infrastructure building completed with minimal risk to the
government and International Community.
• (Narco)-entrepreneurs that take up lucrative building and
maintenance contracts become dependent on the government for
their livelihood giving them a vested interest in supporting the
government’s objectives.
A Pragmatic Approach
The main argument against the Fulcrum Strategy is that it is
providing a money-laundering scheme for drug traffickers.
However this scheme not only launders drugs money but also the
traffickers themselves, they stop being drug dealers and become
legitimate businessmen.
The international community already does a lot of business with
major drug traffickers; they are the politicians, governors and
military commanders they interact with on a daily basis.
Narcotics must be regarded as a disease to be treated rather
than an enemy to be fought, the last thing Afghanistan needs is a
full-blown drugs war.
The Fulcrum Strategy is a radical yet pragmatic approach to the series of interlinked
complex problems that keep Afghanistan dependent on the narcotics industry. The Fulcrum
Strategy deals with the cause rather than the symptoms of the narcotics malaise and takes
the approach of a drug cure rather than a drug war.
A ten phase implementation plan is available to appropriate parties upon request.
Feedback is really important for the further development of this strategy. Please contact David at:
davidjamesemail@googlemail.com
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