Improving U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations
A great piece of work by RAND. It is interesting that it was published in 2008 the year I was preparing to move back to Afghanistan. My conclusion at the time, and still is, is that we should have concentrated on winning the peace in the north not the 'war' in the south. 'Reinforce success and starve failure' as Sun Tzu put it. Seth and the Obama administration came to the opposite conclusion. I just wonder what Afghanistan would look like now if we'd spent $120 billion on development in the north rather than on the war in the south.
I also think there should be more on building support for the government by creating jobs and economic opportunity. But aside from those personal observations it is a comprehensive review of recent counter insurgency operations and the relevant lessons for Afghanistan. COMMENT ENDS.
From the RAND website
In an effort to better understand the insurgency and its causes, the RAND Corporation conducted an exhaustive set of primary source interviews in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and Europe (including multiple visits to Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008); reviewed relevant government documents; and examined the literature on 90 insurgencies since 1945 to identify factors that can be correlated with success and failure.
The study found that governments with high levels of popular support prevailed in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, but they won less than a third of the insurgencies when they had medium or low levels of support. In addition, insurgent groups that enjoyed support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from nonstate actors and diaspora groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. Moreover, sanctuary in neighboring states was particularly important for insurgent groups.
The study identified some initial key steps to counter insurgent support, which are highlighted in the table.
Improving governance
Prosecute corrupt government officials and mid- and high-level drug traffickers; the failure to do so is eroding popular support for the government.
Continue building Afghan security forces, especially increasing police mentors in the field.
Focus on strategic reconstruction projects, such as Kaiaki Dam for electricity, which can provide key services to rural areas.
Ensure secure and successful 2009 democratic elections.
Increasing support to government
Increase the number of U.S./NATO forces by at least 28,000.
Refocus U.S./NATO resources on southern Afganistan.
Decreasing support to insurgents
Lessons Learned from Afghanistan - 2008 - Seth Jones
DJ COMMENT:A great piece of work by RAND. It is interesting that it was published in 2008 the year I was preparing to move back to Afghanistan. My conclusion at the time, and still is, is that we should have concentrated on winning the peace in the north not the 'war' in the south. 'Reinforce success and starve failure' as Sun Tzu put it. Seth and the Obama administration came to the opposite conclusion. I just wonder what Afghanistan would look like now if we'd spent $120 billion on development in the north rather than on the war in the south.
I also think there should be more on building support for the government by creating jobs and economic opportunity. But aside from those personal observations it is a comprehensive review of recent counter insurgency operations and the relevant lessons for Afghanistan. COMMENT ENDS.
From the RAND website
In an effort to better understand the insurgency and its causes, the RAND Corporation conducted an exhaustive set of primary source interviews in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and Europe (including multiple visits to Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008); reviewed relevant government documents; and examined the literature on 90 insurgencies since 1945 to identify factors that can be correlated with success and failure.
What Variables Are Key to Counterinsurgency Success or Failure?
Based on the examination of 90 insurgencies since World War II, RAND found two major factors linked with the success (and failure) of past counterinsurgency efforts: (1) the degree of local support for the government and (2) external support for insurgents, including sanctuary.The study found that governments with high levels of popular support prevailed in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, but they won less than a third of the insurgencies when they had medium or low levels of support. In addition, insurgent groups that enjoyed support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from nonstate actors and diaspora groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. Moreover, sanctuary in neighboring states was particularly important for insurgent groups.
The study identified some initial key steps to counter insurgent support, which are highlighted in the table.
Improving governance
Increasing support to government
Decreasing support to insurgents
- Increase pressure on Pakistan to counter the Taliban and end government support for militants.
- Establish a regional dialogue with Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia (reviving the 2001 Bonn approach) toward stabilizing Afghanistan.
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